COMMENT AND CASE NOTES

to understand exactly what proof must be submitted. A large number of
cases have occurred where subsequent changes in the status of the soldier's
eligible relatives or dependents, including persons to be added to or removed from the list of beneficiaries, have not been properly reported. For
example, an application for a family allowance has been made for a wife,
some time later a child is born for whom a family allowance is also desired.
The change should be reported on the official change of status form and
documentary evidence should be submitted in support of the change.
The evidence required is the same as that required in making similar
claims on original applications.
The original legislation for family allowances for the dependents of men
in the armed forces was enacted soon after the need for the same became
apparent. It is to be recognized that for some the allowances provided for
even under the liberal amendments will be insufficient to meet needs because the allowances are uniform for dependents of specified types and
do not take into account wide differences in living costs and family
circumstances. On the other hand, there are many who do not need any
family allowance at all because of adequate income from other sources.
It is difficult if not impossible to do exact justice to all in such a tremendous emergency undertaking. The amendments certainly do serve to
achieve to some further degree the utilitarian principle of the greatest
good for the greatest number. The system now in operation under the
Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, as amended, is certainly
the most liberal wartime provision ever made by any government in the
history of the world for its fighting forces,5 with a resultant vast benefit
to their welfare and morale.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE "VESTED RIGHTS"
THEORY OF CONTRACTS
Advocated by Beale, the Restatement, and the Hornbook as just and
logical,' the principle that a contract should be, and must be, governed
by the "law" of the state where it was "made" (i.e., "where the last act
necessary to make it a binding agreement takes place"' 2) has long been
sFor a survey of the allowance systems in other countries in i94o,see Marianne Sakmann,
Foreign Provisions for the Dependents of Mobilized Men, Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 4, No.
4, April, 1941.
' 2 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1o91 (i935), hereafter cited as Beale; Rest.,
Conflict of Laws § 311 (1934), hereafter cited as Rest.; Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict
of Laws 274 (1938), hereafter cited as Goodrich.

2Goodrich, p. 262.
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accepted and supposedly followed by American courts in conflicts of
laws cases. 3 Under this rule, the court of the forum has simply to look to
"the general law of contracts,"4 apply it to the facts in controversy, and
ascertain the place "in which .... the principal event necessary to make a
contract occurs." ' When ascertained, that place is "the place of contracting." If an enforceable contractual duty there arises under its laws,
"the duty thus imposed will be recognized and enforced in common law
states ..... " 6 While, on this reasoning, only the law of "the place of contracting" regulates the validity of the contract, apart from special exceptions, 7 the Court enunciated a parallel doctrine whereby a state could
regulate parties to a contract executed elsewhere if the parties were "doing
business" within the state. As was stated in the Allgeyer case, "the right
to contract [within the State] in relation to persons or property or to do
business within the jurisdiction of the State may be regulated and sometimes prohibited when the contracts or business conflict with the policy of
the State as contained in its statutes."8 Note that doing business is distinguished from making contracts. Both are valid subjects of regulation.
Thus, a business locally carried on but involving contracts executed elsewhere must conform to the local law, even if the extent of the regulation
must, under the Constitution, be limited to the business done within the
state. Where lqcal statutes prescribe regulations contrary to those of "the
place of contracting," an obvious inconsistency results. This note will
briefly describe some of the varied attempts to resolve this inconsistency.
In Ne&w York Life Ins. Co. v. Crams9 the Supreme Court held that a
3 2 Beale, p. 1173.

4 Rest., § 3'1, comment

(d).

5Ibid.

"Principal event" is synonymous with "last act." Rest., §§ 312-21. Cook indicates
Beale has extended this.rule too far. Cook, 'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws 31 fll. L. Rev..
143, 173-77 (1936), reprinted in Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
347, 382-87 (1942). For Beale's attitude see 2 Beale, p. 1072.
6Rest., § 395. This is the "vested rights" theory. See Cook, op. cit. supra, note 5.
7The "law of the place of performance" is said to govern as to such matters as the manner,
the time, the locality, and the sufficiency of performance, "the person or persons by whom or
to whom performance shall be made or rendered," and the "excuse for non-performance."
Rest., § 358; Goodrich, pp. 293-97. For the attempted distinction between a "question of
obligation" governed by "the place of contracting" and a "question of performance" governed
by "the place of performance" see Rest., § 358, comment (b); Goodrich, p. 294. The distinction
is criticized in Cook, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 154 ff., reprinted in Cook, op. cit. supra, note 5,
at 359 ff.
As to causes of action contrary to "the strong public policy of the forum," see Rest., § 612;
Goodrich, pp. 231-34; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 12o N.E. 198 (igis). Cf.
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. (2d) 597 (x936).
8

Allgeyer v. Louisiana, I65 U.S. 578, 591 (1897). Italics added.
1I78 U.S. 389 (1goo).
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contract entered into between a Missouri citizen and a foreign insurance
company "doing business" within Missouri could be constitutionally
regulated by Missouri statutes even though the contract was not "made" in
Missouri.o The power to regulate was held to stem from the doing of
business within the state. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge," a case arising seventeen years later, the Court was asked to determine the power of
Missouri to apply its non-forfeiture statute to a loan agreement "made"
in New York between residents of Missouri and an insurance company
admittedly "doing business" in Missouri. The loan agreement was made
subsequently to the issuance in Missouri of an insurance policy which the
Court conceded was a Missouri contract and which would be substantially
affected by the treatment of the later contract. The Court mechanically
applied the rule stated above: the "last act" making the loan binding
was performed in New York; therefore the "place of contracting" was
New York; therefore New York law governed; therefore Missouri law
did not. The Court attempted to distinguish the Cravens case by saying:
"the controversy [in the Cravensdecision] related to the interpretation and
effect of an original policy-not a later good faith agreement between the
parties. ' x2 The Court ignored the fact that the contract involved in the
Cravens case was apparently executed wsthout the state of Missouri and
that Missouri's power to regulate depended on the foreign company's doing business within Missouri, not on the contract's being a Missouri contract.X3 Four years later, in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing,X4 the Court
was faced with precisely the same problem. This time, however, the
Court construed the original policy of insurance as making loans on the
policy mandatory, whereas it thought that in the Dodge case the home
office of the company in New York had discretion. This distinction enabled
the Court to call the loan agreement a Missouri contract, and hence, subject to Missouri statutes. The Court reasoned as follows: "as soon as the
application [for the loan] was delivered to a representative of the company
in Missouri, the offer in the policy [to make the loan] was accepted and the
new contract complete, and therefore subject to Missouri law. If, how10The Cravens case has usually been cited as a case where Missouri could regulate because
the contract was "made" in Missouri. See Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts 553 (1942). But stress is equally laid on the doing of business in Missouri, and the
"place of contracting" is not made clear.
" 246 U.S. 357 (i9i8).
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2
U.S. 357, 373 (i918),3 The Court also thought that the loan contract was "fair." But see note io, supra.
14259 U.S. 209 (1922).
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ever, the application should be regarded as only an offer, the effectives
acceptance of it did not take place until the check was delivered to Blees
[the insured], which again was in Missouri where he lived.," 6 Yet in the
Dodge case the home office mailed the check to the insured, so it could
have been there said also that "the effective acceptance did not take place
until the check was delivered." The language in the original policies of
both cases also deserves comparison. In the Dodge case the policy had
stated: "Cash loans can be obtained by the insured on the sole security
of this policy on demand at any time after this policy has been in force
two full years .... [providing certain conditions were met]."' 7 The original policy in the Liebing case provided: "the company will .... loan
amounts within the limits of the cash surrender value .... [providing certain conditions were observed, including the assigning of the policy as
security]."'" To the writer there seems no substantial difference in meaning between the two provisions. The only logically fair inference is that
the Liebing case in effect overruled the Dodge decision.'9 The disturbing
aspect of the Dodge and Liebing cases, however, is in their reasoning. In
spite of their opposite conclusions both decisions rest on the same theory:
''
the law to be applied should be the law of "the place of contracting. 20
In the Dodge case the Court thought it saw "the last act" in a different
place than it thought it saw it in the Liebing case. Yet in both cases it
was content to reach a decision with no investigation whatsoever as to the
political or economic wisdom of its decision. Though the rule be wise in
many situations,21 to apply it mechanically as the Court did in both cases
is to ignore the original reasons for its creation.22 The inadequacy of this
approach to the defining of state power was soon again made evident. In
XS
What is

an "ineffective" acceptance?

16 259 U.S. 209, 214 (1922).

7 246 U.S. 357, 368 (19r8).
18 259 U.S. 209, 212, 214 (1922).

'9 See Carnahan, op. cit. supra, note io, at 554. While the Dodge case was by a majority
of five to four, the Liebing case was unanimous. But in subsequent cases the Dodge'case is
frequently cited and is not treated as overruled by the Liebing decision.

"0Although Mr. Justice Holmes was one of the majority in the Dodge case, he wrote the
opinion for the unanimous Court in the Liebing case. His concluding sentence was: "In whichever way regarded the facts lead to the same conclusion, and although the circumstances may
present some temptation to seek a different one by ingenuity, the Constitution and the first
principles of legal thinking allow the law of the place where a contract is made to determine the
validity and the consequences of the act." Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Liebing, 259
U.S. 209, 214 (1922).
21The problem of fairness is, of course, one of degree. The governing desiderata should be
the fulfillment of justified expectations and the avoidance of surprise. Rheinstein, Methods of
Legal Thought and the Conflict of Laws: A Book Review, io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 466, 476-77
(1943).

- See the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Dodge case, 246 U.S., 357, 382-83 (i918).
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Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. DunkenW3 the Court faced almost the same problem
that had been presented by the Dodge and Liebing cases. The insured,
while a resident of Tennessee, contracted for insurance in a Connecticut
company. Since he applied for the policy, and had it delivered, in
Tennessee, on the rule quoted from the Liebing case, the contract could be
said to have been made in Tennessee. 24 The policy provided that at the
sole option of the insured it could be converted into a life commercial
policy on payment of the difference between the premiums already paid
and those required under the converted policy. The insured then moved
to Texas, whose statutes imposed a penalty on any insurance company
failing to make payment thirty days after demand. While residing in
Texas, the insured applied to the Tennessee agent to convert the policy.
The home office issued the new policy and forwarded it to the Tennessee
agent who, in turn, mailed it to the insured. A Texas jury found that it
was the company's intent that the new policy become effective when received by the insured. The insured died; the company failed to pay
within thirty days. The Court decided that the courts of Texas could not
constitutionally apply the Texas penal statute. Their reason was the
familiar one already encountered. The conversion of the original policy
was fully in accordance with the original contract. "Nothing was left to
future agreement. ' '1 5 Since the original contract was made in Tennessee,
it followed by inexorable logic that the "subsidiary" contract was also
governed by the law of Tennessee.26 The similarity to the Liebing case
is obvious, but one difference is important. In the Liebing case the state
which was allowed authority over the contract was the state of residence of
the insured. In the Aetna case, Tennessee at the time of the conversion
had only a casual contact with the parties involved. Presumably, the insured in Texas could have acted directly with the Connecticut home office
in effecting the conversion. Again, however, the important observation is
the mechanical behavior of the Court.
In Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission of Cali7 the Court dearly abandoned the former rule-of-thumb and there,
fornia,2
and in succeeding cases, went on to establish a new doctrine. No longer did
the Constitution require that blind deference be paid to the state where
the contract had been "made." If a contract was made in state X but
23 266

U.S. 389 (1924).

24The court so held.

2,266 U.S. 389, 399 (1924).

Note the manner in which the Aetna case is cited in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
292 U.S. 143, 149 (1934); cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930).
2

v. Delta & Pine Land Co.,
27294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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arose for adjudication in state Y, and if both X and Y had statutes
applicable to the controversy, the courts of Y could ignore the laws of X
and apply the statute of their own state. If the controversy arose in the
courts of X, they could also apply their own laws, counter to the commands of Y. The only constitutional limitation imposed by the Court
under the due process and full faith and credit clauses was that the
statute be "reasonable"; that is, that the state applying its own law have
substantial governmental interests at stake. The new determinant of
cases becomes the public policy of the forum, since the Court has indicated
that it will allow considerable discretion to the states in applying their own
statutes. Of course, the state of the forum may allow the foreign statute
to be applied where the contract was "made" in the other state, but it is
not bound to do So.21
Hoopeston CanningCo. v. Pink29 is the most recent Supreme Court manifestation of this attitude. The plaintiffs were part of a large system of
reciprocal insurers doing business in many states but linked together for
insurance purposes through contracts "made" in Illinois. In issue was the
constitutionality of a New York statute, as applied to the plaintiffs, requiring that insurance companies observe certain financial, bookkeeping,
and legal practices-whether within or without the state--in order to
secure licenses in New York. The plaintiffs argued that the New York
law was inapplicable since the contracts were "made" without the state.
But the Court upheld the application to the plaintiffs of the New York
statute. It held that New York had a reasonably sufficient governmental interest in its local property to warrant the regulation of insurance
affecting it. The argument that the contracts were not "made" in New
York was dismissed as technical and unsubstantial.
The significant difference of this decision from preceding ones rests in
the difficult problem it raises. It was apparently possible for the reciprocal
2sIn Bradford Electric Light Co. Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), the deceased resided

and made a contract of employment in Vermont, but suffered injury and death while temporarily in New Hampshire in the course of his employment. The Court held that the Vermont Workmen's Compensation Law had to be applied even though the suit was brought in
New Hampshire. Mr. Justice Stone concurred even though he thought New Hampshire could
not be forced to apply the Vermont statue in preference to its own law because he presumed
the New Hampshire court would decide the case as the Supreme Court had done. His concurring opinion is the forerunner of the present position of the Court. See also Osborn v. Ozlin,
310 U.S. 53 (1940); Griffin v. McCoach, 33 U.S. 498 (1941).

The new attitude raises interest as to the future history of the celebrated case of Fauntleroy
v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (I9o8), where the Court held that Mississippi had to recognize a Missouri
judgment obtained on a gambling transaction in cotton futures in Mississippi even though the
laws of Mississippi made such a dealing a misdemeanor. The full faith and credit clause makes
no distinction between "public acts" and "judicial proceedings."

29 63 S.Ct. 602 (1943).

COMMENT AND CASE NOTES

insurers in the Hoopeston case to conform their practices to the New York
statutes and still operate in other states. Suppose, however, that Illinois,
where the attorney-in-fact through whom the contracts were "made"
resides, or some other state where the group carries on a considerable insurance business, enacts statutes requiring financial, legal, or book-keeping practices different from those required by New York? Since both
statutes would apply to all operations, whether within the state or without, the dilemma raised by the conflict would make continued operation
of the business impossible. In such a situation, the Court would be
forced to command that one of the two states yield to the other. The
Court could no longer say that each state was free to apply its own
statutes, based on its own public policy, within its own borders.
But though the mechanical rule-of-thumb is now being disregarded in
many situations, it still has vitality. The recent case of United States v.
CurtissAeroplane CoY' is an example of how blindly the rule may still be
applied. Here the United States, as assignee, was suing the Curtiss Co.
for breaches of contracts made between the Curtiss Co. and the Imperial
Russian Government. The terms of the contract are incompletely reported, but delivery was to be in New York, "transportation to Russia at
the expense and risk of the latter [Russia], and demonstrations in Russia
at expense and risk of [Curtiss]."3' After also noting that "the defendant
was a New York corporation"32-which, of course, has nothing to do with
where the contract is "made"--the court summarily concluded: "These
facts do not justify any conclusion other than that the New York rule of
limitations [that is, New York law] shall govern."' 3
It may be that applying the law of New York was the wisest decision.
The point is, however, that no investigation whatsoever was made or even
thought necessary as to the wisdom of the choice of law.34 Since the place
of performance has often been held the place whose law shall govern the
contract, 3s the habit patterns of the court were not disturbed. It could
note that New York was the place of delivery, and then it was content
that no more was necessary.
The status of the mechanical rule is, therefore, confused. It may or may
not be applied, depending probably on the facts, the arguments of counsel
30 50 F. Supp. 477 (N.Y. 1943).

32 bid.

3' Tbid., at 487.

33 1bid.

34 It

should be said in the court's defense that the plaintiff was guilty of poor pleading.
While it complained that the plaintiff had failed "to set forth the Russian law applicable to the
complex questions," it neglected to allege the Russian law or that the Russian law governed
the case.
3 Note 7, supra.
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and the attitude of the courts. Its demise to the extent noted, however, is
to be welcomed. The more recent Supreme Court approach tries to pay
attention to underlying conceptions of state policy.3 This seems a more
reasonable basis for rules of law than what might be called a "jurisprudence of conceptions." Yet, as indicated, this rule raises problems of
its own. Conflicts and confusion may result. The increasing power of the
states to travel independent paths of social policy may well be undesirable in a nation whose problems are nation-wide in scope and whose aim
is interstate harmony.
The Constitution of the United States provides an adequate remedy.
Section x of Article 4 declares: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedingsshall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." 7 Thus far Congress has only slightly used this power; yet it
seems broad enough to empower Congress to work out principles sufficient
38
to dispel the present uncertainties.
THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE-AN ARGUMENT FOR
ITS ABROGATION
T devised certain property to A for life with a remainder to A's surviving children. The devise further provided, that if A died leaving no
children surviving her, then the "title to the real estate named in
this item to vest in fee simple in the brothers & sisters and their heirs,
of her the said [A] who may survive her." A's brothers and three sons of
her deceased sister quit-claimed all their interest in the premises to A.
Some forty years later, A died leaving no children surviving her. Her
three brothers and her sister had predeceased her. A sought to dispose
of the property by will. Certain children, the heirs of the brothers and
sister, contended that the word "heirs" in the devise over to the "brothers
and sisters and their heirs" designated them as a class of purchasers. In
answer to this contention, the court held that "the words 'their heirs' are
words of limitation and not of purchase and the rule in Shelley's Case
36 Evenin the Hoopeston case the Court's analysis was simplified, however. Only the social
policy of New York was considered. The problems of Illinois, if any, and their relation to the
general problem of regulation were ignored.
37Italics added.
3SCook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 Yale L. J. 421
(igig), reprinted as chapter 4 in Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
(1942).

